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THE LESSONS FROM LIBOR FOR DETECTION AND DETERRENCE OF 
CARTEL WRONGDOING 
 
Rosa M. Abrantes-Metz* and D. Daniel Sokol ** 
     
In late June 2012, Barclays entered a $453 million settlement with U.K. and U.S. 
regulators due to its manipulation of the London Interbank Offered Rate (Libor) between 
2005 and 2009.1 The Department of Justice (DOJ) Antitrust Division was among the 
antitrust authorities and regulatory agencies from around the world that investigated 
Barclays.  
We hesitate to draw overly broad conclusions until more facts come out in the 
public domain. What we note at this time, based on public information, is that the Libor 
conspiracy and manipulation seems not to be the work of a rogue trader. Participation in a 
price fixing conduct, by its very nature, requires the involvement of more than one firm. 
In this case, the conspiracy seems to have been organized across firms and required the 
active knowledge of a number of individuals at relatively high levels of seniority among 
certain Libor setting banks. Such collusion across firms is at the core of illegal antitrust 
behavior. The Supreme Court has deemed combating the pernicious effects of cartels so 
central to antitrust’s mission that it has stated that cartels are “the supreme evil of 
antitrust.”2 
The involvement of more than one bank in such a cartel is a significant corporate 
governance failure due to the coordination that such a cartel would have required among 
the various cartel members. It is perhaps even more surprising that the Libor cartel seems 
to have occurred in such a highly regulated industry after a wave of corporate governance 
reforms post-Enron and a push for greater internal compliance in the early 2000s. Yet, the 
                                                
* Adjunct Associate Professor at NYU Stern School of Business, Department of Economics, and 
Principal at Global Economics Group. I thank Albert Metz for discussions.   
** Visiting Professor of Law (2012-13) University of Minnesota School of Law, Associate Professor 
of Law, University of Florida Levin College of Law. I want to thank Claire Hill and Bruce Shnider for 
their suggestions. 
1 Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Barclays Bank PLC Admits Misconduct Related to 
Submissions for the London Interbank Offered Rate and the Euro Interbank Offered Rate and Agrees to 
Pay $160 Million Penalty (Jun. 27, 2012), http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/2012/June/12-crm-815.html. 
2 Verizon Commc’n Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, 540 U.S. 398, 408 (2004). 
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very nature of the manipulation, in hindsight, seems rather obvious. The rate did not 
move for over a year until the day before the financial crisis of 2009 hit.3 Also, quotes by 
the member banks that were submitted under seal moved simultaneously to the same 
number from one day to the next during that time period.4 Had any member bank that sets 
Libor or any antitrust authority undertaken an econometric screen, they likely would have 
detected these anomalies, undertaken a more in-depth investigation, and discovered the 
wrongdoing. 
This essay explores the use of econometric screens, either by enforcement 
authorities or firms themselves, as a tool to both improve detection of potential price 
fixing cartel behavior and police illegal firm behavior.  
 
I. The Use of Econometric Screens 
The art of flagging unlawful behavior through economic and statistical analyses is 
commonly known as screening. A screen is a statistical test based on an econometric 
model and a theory of the alleged illegal behavior, designed to identify whether 
manipulation, collusion, fraud, or any other type of cheating may exist in a particular 
market, who may be involved, and how long it may have lasted.5 “Screens use commonly 
available data such as prices . . . market shares, bids, transaction quotes, spreads, 
volumes, and other data to identify patterns that are anomalous or highly improbable.”6 
As established through the identification of the alleged Libor conspiracy and 
manipulation, and other previous successes, screens can be very powerful tools when 
properly developed and implemented; however, they do require expertise. There are two 
golden rules of screens: (i) one size does not fit all; and (ii) if you put garbage in, you get 
garbage out.7 Without expertise in developing a screen, the attempt at screening will 
likely fail. Such failure should not be attributed to the screening methodology itself 
generally, but to the errors in development and application in a particular case.8 
In general, we can point to six requirements to appropriately develop and 
implement an effective antitrust screen for collusive behavior: (i) an understanding of the 
                                                
3 Rosa M. Abrantes-Metz et al., Libor Manipulation?, 36 J. BANKING & FIN. 136, 144 (2012). The 
authors mark the beginning of the financial crisis with three related announcements on August 9, 2007, 
concerning: “(a) a coordinated intervention by the European Central Bank, the Federal Reserve Bank, and 
the Bank of Japan; (b) AIG’s warning that defaults were spreading beyond the subprime sector; and (c) 
BNP Paribas’ suspension of three mortgage-backed funds.” Id. at 140.   
4 Id. at 144.   
5 See generally Rosa M. Abrantes-Metz, Design and Implementation of Screens and Their Use by 
Defendants, CPI ANTITRUST CHRON. (Sept. 28, 2011), 
https://www.competitionpolicyinternational.com/file/view/6547 (describing the design of successful 
econometric screens). 
6 Id. at 2. 
7 Id. at 3 
8 Id.  
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market at hand, including its key drivers, the nature of competition, and the potential 
incentives to cheat—both internally and externally—for the firm; (ii) a theory on the 
nature of the cheating; (iii) a theory on how such cheating will affect market outcomes; 
(iv) the design of a statistic capable of capturing the key factors of the theory of 
collusion, fraud, or the relevant type of cheating; (v) empirical or theoretical support for 
the screen; and (vi) the identification of an appropriate non-tainted benchmark against 
which the evidence of collusion or relevant cheating can be compared.9  
 
II. Screens and the Libor 
Worldwide investigations have been launched on allegations of a possible 
conspiracy by several major banks to manipulate the U.S. dollar Libor and Libor rates 
denominated in other currencies. These investigations followed the application of 
empirical screens that flagged unexpected patterns in the Libor setting, representing the 
latest example of the power of screens to flag potentially illegal behavior in the antitrust 
context.  
Arguably, the investigations into Libor manipulation and alleged collusive activity 
began with a series of articles published in the Wall Street Journal in April and May of 
2008 which alleged that several global banks were reporting unjustifiably low borrowing 
costs for the calculation of Libor.10 The Wall Street Journal noticed that from January 
2008, the banks’ individual Libor quotes were too low when compared to their respective 
credit default swaps prices.11  
Abrantes-Metz et al. followed with an August 2008 working paper in which these 
and other patterns were studied in greater detail using econometric screens.12 This 
working paper noted that: (i) the Libor was essentially constant for a long period prior to 
the financial crisis, since at least January 2007, while comparable rates varied over time; 
(ii) most banks’ quotes were identical for most of the same period while the banks’ 
market implied credit ratings varied over time and in comparison to each other, meaning 
that some differences (even if slight) in their borrowing costs, and hence in their Libor 
quotes, would have been expected; and (iii) the Libor was unresponsive to changing 
market conditions in the late spring and early summer of 2008 when risk in the economy 
                                                
9 Cf. Rosa Abrantes-Metz & Patrick Bajari, Screens for Conspiracies and Their Multiple 
Applications, 24 ANTITRUST 66 (2009) (providing a survey of screening methodologies and their multiple 
applications); Joseph E. Harrington, Jr., Behavioral Screening and the Detection of Cartels, in EUROPEAN 
COMPETITION LAW ANNUAL 2006: ENFORCEMENT OF PROHIBITION OF CARTELS (Claus-Dieter 
Ehlermann & Isabela Atanasiu eds., 2007) (suggesting the increased use of screens to promote cartel 
detection). 
10 Carrick Mollenkamp & Laurence Norman, British Bankers Group Steps Up Review of Widely Used 
Libor, WALL ST. J., Apr. 17, 2008 at C7; Carrick Mollenkamp & Mark Whitehouse, Study Casts Doubt 
on Key Rate, WALL ST. J., May 29, 2008, at A1.  
11 Mollenkamp & Whitehouse, supra note 10. 
12 Abrantes-Metz et al., supra note 3. 
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was already starting to increase.13 Other research on the Libor was then conducted that 
identified additional irregularities.14 
 
III. The New Antitrust Paradox Part I 
In 1978, Robert Bork published the Antitrust Paradox in which he decried the lack 
of sound economic analysis in antitrust law.15 The paradox was that a law that was 
supposed to lead to greater efficiency actually raised prices because legal analysis was 
not rooted in economics.16 The antitrust law of today is quite different from that of the 
period during which Bork wrote. In its present form, antitrust is perhaps the area in which 
the economic analysis of law has driven doctrinal and policy developments more than 
any other substantive field.17   
Antitrust cases addressing issues such as mergers, predation, tying, and bundling 
have applied industrial organization economics in identifying behavior that might distort 
the market.18 This sophisticated analysis is not limited to agency practice. Antitrust case 
law cites law reviews that use economic analysis and economics journals in its 
decisions.19 One cannot undertake antitrust analysis—whether by agencies or private 
parties—in either the merger area or civil antitrust litigation without significant economic 
analysis at every stage of decision-making. Even firms’ business strategies take antitrust 
considerations into account.20 
                                                
13 Id. 
14 E.g., Connan Snider & Thomas Youle, Does the Libor Reflect Banks’ Borrowing Costs? (Working 
Paper, 2010), available at http://www.econ.umn.edu/~youle001/libor_4_01_10.pdf; Rosa M. Abrantes-
Metz et al., Tracking the Libor Rate, 18 APPLIED ECON. LETTERS 1 (2011); Rosa M. Abrantes-Metz & 
Albert D. Metz, How Far Can Screens Go in Distinguishing Explicit from Tacit Collusion? New Evidence 
from the Libor Setting, CPI ANTITRUST CHRON. (Mar. 13, 2012), 
https://www.competitionpolicyinternational.com/file/view/6642; Rosa M. Abrantes-Metz, Libor 
Litigation and the Role of Screening, CPI ANTITRUST CHRON. (Jul. 28, 2011), 
https://www.competitionpolicyinternational.com/file/view/6521. 
15 ROBERT H. BORK, THE ANTITRUST PARADOX: A POLICY AT WAR WITH ITSELF (1978). 
16 Id.  
17 See Bruce H. Kobayashi & Timothy J. Muris, Chicago, Post-Chicago, and Beyond, 78 ANTITRUST 
L.J. 147, 147–54 (2012); see also Barak Orbach & D. Daniel Sokol, Antitrust Energy, 85 S. CAL. L. REV. 
429, 439 (2012) (“The evolution of antitrust has been shaped by changing lines of economic thinking and 
ideologies.”). 
18 For an overview of the literature, see, for example, OXFORD HANDBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL 
ANTITRUST ECONOMICS (Roger D. Blair & D. Daniel Sokol eds.) (forthcoming); ABA SECTION OF 
ANTITRUST LAW, ISSUES IN COMPETITION LAW AND POLICY (Wayne Dale Collins ed., 2008). 
19 See, for example, Leegin Creative Leather Prod., Inc. v. PSKS, Inc., 551 U.S. 877 (2007), which 
cited an economic textbook, and articles from the Journal of Law and Economics, Rand Journal of 
Economics, Quarterly Journal of Economics, and the Journal of Political Economy in addition to law 
review articles that use economic analysis. 
20 See generally Thomas B. Leary, The Dialogue Between Students of Business and Students of 
Antitrust, 47 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 1 (2003). 
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This rigorously applied industrial organization analysis of antitrust on the civil 
side is distinct from antitrust analysis on the criminal side. In certain critical ways, 
antitrust cartel enforcement in the United States looks more like other non-antitrust, 
white-collar crime enforcement than the heavily economics-driven antitrust 
monopolization or merger enforcement. Indeed, U.S. criminal antitrust enforcement is 
different not merely from other areas of antitrust but from some other areas of white-
collar crime in which econometrics play a more significant role.  
 
IV. The New Antitrust Paradox Part II 
The DOJ Antitrust Division’s criminal enforcement does not only differ from the 
rest of the Antitrust Division in its lack of econometric screening. The reluctance to use 
screening methods also puts antitrust criminal enforcement at odds with some other types 
of financial crime enforcement. Indeed, screens are used regularly in the detection of 
financial wrongdoing, tax evasion, and bid rigging.21 Econometric screens were 
employed to flag illegal behavior in financial markets in several notable instances, 
including the recent stock options backdating and spring loading cases from the mid 
2000s and the 1994 break of an alleged conspiracy by NASDAQ dealers in which odd-
eighths quotes were avoided.22 Detection of both of these scandals was triggered by the 
application of screens to financial data and generated large-scale public investigations as 
well as private litigation.23  
Other regulatory agencies worldwide routinely use screens to help detect illegal 
behavior in other areas and markets, not only conspiracies and manipulations, but also 
insider trading, tax evasion, revenues management, and other types of accounting 
manipulations. These agencies include the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission, 
the U.S. Commodities Futures Trading Commission, the U.S. Department of 
Transportation, and the U.S. Internal Revenue Service. 24  
 
V. How Screens Fit into Current Antitrust Enforcement 
                                                
21 See, e.g., Patrick Bajari & Jungwon Yeo, Auction Design and Tacit Collusion in FCC Spectrum 
Auctions, 21 INFO. ECON. & POL'Y 90, 100 (2009); Randall A. Heron & Erik Lie, Does Backdating 
Explain the Stock Price Pattern Around Executive Stock Option Grants?, 83 J. FIN. ECON. 271, 294 
(2007); Mark Nigrini, A Taxpayer Compliance Application of Benford's Law, 18 J. AM. TAX'N ASS'N 72, 
87 (1996); Robert H. Porter & J. Douglas Zona, Detection of Bid Rigging in Procurement Auctions, 101 J. 
POL. ECON. 518, 537 (1993); Robert H. Porter & J. Douglas Zona, Ohio School Milk Markets: An 
Analysis of Bidding, 30 RAND J. ECON. 263, 287 (1999). 
22 Rosa M. Abrantes-Metz, The Power of Screens to Trigger Investigations, 10 SEC. LITIG. REP., Nov. 
2010, at 18–21. 
23 Id. 
24 Rosa M. Abrantes-Metz & Andrew Verstein, Revolution in Manipulation Law: The New CFTC 
Rules and the Urgent Need for Economic and Empirical Analyses, 14 U. PA. J. BUS. L. (forthcoming). 
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The most important recent development in criminal antitrust enforcement has been 
the introduction of the leniency program. Leniency destabilizes a cartel through defection 
of a cartel member who reports the cartel activity to antitrust authorities in return for a 
reduced penalty.25 Yet, in spite of the success of leniency, current antitrust enforcement 
seems far from optimal deterrence of cartels, with detection rates of approximately 
twenty percent.26 
We believe that the use of antitrust econometric screens will encourage increased 
cartel detection and increase costs for the creation of new cartels. Screens have already 
been used to detect anomalies in pricing in a number of jurisdictions. Notable screens 
include those done by the U.S. Federal Trade Commission,27 Brazil’s C.A.D.E.,28 and 
Mexico’s C.F.C.,29 among others.  
Screens complement the leniency program, as they are able to draw enforcers’ 
attention to anomalous behavior that the leniency program cannot detect. It may well be 
that leniency is more likely to fail to detect some of the most successful cartels, whose 
members have less incentive to apply for leniency because they all enjoy significantly 
larger profits than under non-collusion. Ironically, these may also be the cartels that cause 
the most harm to consumers. Cases detected through leniency programs are, after all, 
self-selected. Screens might also assist in the detection of cartels in economic sectors 
different from those historically detected by leniency. 
Successful screens provide enforcers clues about behavior that increase the 
likelihood of finding hard evidence of a conspiracy.30 Increased enforcement activity due 
to the investigation around the screen may be enough to encourage at least one firm to be 
more likely to defect from a cartel and to seek leniency.31   
                                                
25 D. Daniel Sokol, Cartels, Corporate Compliance and What Practitioners Really Think About 
Enforcement, 78 ANTITRUST L.J. 201, 204–07 (2012). 
26 Peter G. Bryant & E. Woodrow Eckard, Price Fixing: The Probability of Getting Caught, 73 REV. 
ECON. & STAT. 531, 535 (1991) (analyzing the period 1961–1988). 
27 See Rosa M. Abrantes-Metz et al., A Variance Screen for Collusion, 24 INT'L J. INDUS. ORG. 467 
(2006) (searching for collusion in gasoline markets). 
28 See Carlos Emmanuel Joppert Ragazzo, Screens in the Gas Retail Market: The Brazilian 
Experience, CPI ANTITRUST CHRON. (Mar. 13, 2012), 
https://www.competitionpolicyinternational.com/file/view/6645. 
29 See Carlos Mena-Labarthe, Mexican Experience in Screens for Bid-Rigging, CPI ANTITRUST 
CHRON. (Mar. 13 2012), https://www.competitionpolicyinternational.com/file/view/6644. 
30 On what constitutes a conspiracy for antitrust purposes, see Louis Kaplow, On The Meaning of 
Horizontal Agreements in Competition Law, 99 CALIF. L. REV. 683 (2011); see also William E. Kovacic 
et al., Plus Factors and Agreement in Antitrust Law, 110 MICH. L. REV. 393 (2011); William H. Page, 
Communication and Concerted Action, 38 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 405 (2007). 
31 We note that not all screens will be effective and that screens are more resource intensive than 
merely waiting for a leniency applicant to provide hard evidence. However, the investment in some 
screens by the agency will encourage more firms to essentially privatize enforcement and run their own 
screens in industries in which the possibility of collusion may be significant. 
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Similarly, as part of its overall compliance program, a company may choose to run 
its own cartel screen to ensure that its own compliance systems are effective. A company 
that finds unlawful behavior internally will get the benefits of leniency from antitrust 
authorities. In doing so, the investment in its good governance pays off because of a 
firm’s own reduced penalties and in the increased costs that its rivals in the industry—and 
fellow cartel members—will face in terms of fines, imprisonment of key individuals, 
litigation uncertainty, and reputation costs. 
 
VI. Conclusion 
The alleged Libor collusion and manipulation is something that antitrust 
authorities or the banks themselves could have detected had they used econometric 
screens. We believe that as antitrust agencies use screens more often, firms will be more 
likely to use screens as a prophylactic measure in the regular risk assessments they 
undertake to comply with antitrust law. What explains the lack of adoption of screens by 
the DOJ is that it, like many organizations, is slow to respond to changes. However, in a 
world of uncertainty, organizations may copy other organizations, as competition will 
eliminate inferior ideas.32 Given how many other antitrust agencies and other non-
antitrust US agencies implement screens, we believe that imitation should overcome the 
uncertainty that DOJ Antitrust has with screens. 
 
                                                
32 See Armen A. Alchian, Uncertainty, Evolution, and Economic Theory, 58 J. POL. ECON. 211, 213–
14 (1950). 
